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In the past thirty years, cognitive research has 
intensified dramatically. The field of neuroscience has 
solidified and regimented; the field of cognitive 
neuroscience has been born and adapted, and neuro-imaging 
has evolved well past the initial days of EEG and CAT to 
new methods that show us brain functions, and not merely 
structures or corresponding electrical signals. With these 
innovations and others, alongside some one hundred million 
dollars in NIH funding toward brain research over the next 
twelve years1, other academic disciplines are being brought 
into greater interaction with cognitive science on a level 
never before seen. One of the greatest areas of growth in 
cognitive based multi-disciplines is that of law and 
neuroscience, or neurolaw. Broadly speaking, there is much 
anticipation about what sorts of questions the cognitive 
sciences will be able to answer about human responsibility 
and action, and how those answers will affect our legal 
doctrine. There are scholars in both legal and 
neuroscientific camps that claim their respective field 
will win out over the other, with some legal scholars 
arguing that people are held responsible for actions, not 
their brains, while some neuroscientists might argue that 
                                                        
1http://www.nih.gov/about/director/06052014_statement_brain.
htm 
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the entire court system becomes moot if we are simply able 
to give someone a brain scan and determine guilt. However, 
most scholars do not take such extreme views and instead 
realize that neuroscience probably has much to inform of 
our legal doctrine, but that many neuroscientific 
discoveries are not yet, or may never be, applicable to the 
legal realm. Oddly silent in much of this discussion is the 
philosopher. I see the literature emerging in neurolaw as 
largely a discussion between pragmatic legal theorists on 
one hand, while on the other hand are many data driven 
scientists and researchers. While both sides have their own 
theoretical constructs, the debate as a whole seems ripe to 
benefit from a deeper theoretical analysis, one for which 
philosophy is well suited. Ultimately, it seems that the 
most workable solution to any problem will be one where 
theory, data, and pragmatics coexist, and our U.S. legal 
system should be no exception. 
 Herein, I aim to explore one narrow avenue of the 
interplay between these three disciplines. I examine the 
concept of mental capacity as I see it playing an 
instrumental role in resolving some legal questions, 
particularly for elderly people and people with mental 
illness. My approach is to look at two very distinct, 
albeit related places where mental capacity has up to this 
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point been relatively under-theorized as its own distinct 
concept. In the first chapter, I look to bioethics and the 
question of decision-making capacity, how it is measured 
and what it is that we are actually measuring. Within this 
discussion I examine some of the ways that bioethics and 
law inform each other, as well as try to firmly distinguish 
the concept of “capacity” from the concept of “competency.” 
In the second chapter, I look at specific schizophrenic 
symptoms and try to make an argument that specific symptoms 
of some mental disorders might be indicative of an offender 
in fact having a mind disordered enough as to prevent a 
mental state requisite for criminal liability from ever 
forming. Through these two chapters, I hope to show that 
mental capacity is a concept that must be further theorized 
and applied within our legal system, and that it might 
ultimately end up filling many different roles in different 
contexts. Additionally, a secondary goal, when possible, 
will be to elucidate how and why neuroscientific data plays 
a crucial role in uniting theory and courtroom. 
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Chapter I 
Decision Making Capacity and the Road Ahead 
 In this chapter, I examine decision-making capacity, 
(DMC) which in bioethics refers to the ability of a patient 
to make her own personal decisions regarding treatment or 
medical intervention. DMC is important to bioethicists 
because it is one of many issues in which the biomedical 
principle par excellence, autonomy, is brought to bare. The 
basic assumption in the literature and in practice is that 
patient autonomy should be observed and respected at all 
costs; only when the patient is deemed bereft of some 
relevant DMC, should a surrogate decision maker be 
consulted or appointed. This very simple idea has very 
complex and profound implications for patients, their 
family members, medical providers, legal scholars, 
legislators, and a whole host of academic disciplines. 
Ultimately we are faced with a question of under what 
circumstances we can decide that a patient no longer has 
the relevant capacity to make decisions about her best 
interest in her own wellbeing. Determining a patient to 
lack DMC deprives that patient of the choice about further 
medical intervention, the ethical consequences of which are 
widely considered to be justifiable only by appeal to other 
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equally significant moral principles, if at all. It is no 
wonder, then, that philosophers have long weighed in on 
this particular bioethical concern.2  
 However, like most, if not all, bioethical issues, 
theories about decision-making capacity in the hospital 
eventually depend on the legal system for enforcement in 
the most contestable cases. Indeed, much of the discussion 
about DMC comes out of legal necessity. The inherently 
pragmatic nature of the legal system, combined with current 
inconsistencies in assessment of capacity, current 
inconsistencies in ideas about what capacity even is, and 
new scientific data lead many theorists, either implicitly 
or explicitly, to advocate for a more empirically based 
approach to dealing with the question of capacity in 
hospitals. Following, I have two main aims: the first is to 
recount the different respects in which capacity is 
discussed and theorized in recent literature; and the 
second is to discuss how capacity will likely be studied 
and addressed in the future. Through both discussions, I 
hope I can sufficiently elucidate the move to “pragmatize” 
                                                        
2 Susan Wolf. “Law and Bioethics: From Values to Violence.” 
The Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics, vol. 32 ed. 2 (Sumer 
2004) pp. 293. 
Susan Wolf. “Shifting Paradigms in Bioethics and Health 
Law: The Rise of a New Pragmatism.” American Journal of 
Lawn and Medicine, vol. 20 (1994) pp. 395. 
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capacity concerns. I subsequently raise several objections 
to any academic move away from the basic theoretical 
concerns that make DMC such a pressing issue for 
bioethicists in the first place. Ultimately, I hope to 
argue that any meaningful empirical, pragmatic discussion 
of capacity can only take place in the presence of a 
fruitful philosophical notion of agent responsibility. 
However, due to the inherently legal nature of bioethics, 
whatever notion of responsibility we settle on must be 
sufficiently theorized and account for within the legal 
system as well.  
A. What is Decision Making Capacity? 
 To begin with, we need to know not only what capacity 
entails conceptually, but also why it matters to 
bioethicists at all. Unfortunately, neither of these 
questions yields a simple response. So that we can 
understand how scholars use the term capacity, then, I 
first want to discuss what ethical constructs motivate our 
concern with capacity; then I turn to what contemporary 
theories see as its key elements. Finally, in this section, 
I will make an important distinction between the notions of 
capacity and competency, two related but different concepts 
that are often conflated or not carefully enough 
delineated. This distinction will preamble the discussion 
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in the next section about how capacity is assessed in 
medical practice and various problems that arise within 
that assessment, practically, legally, and ethically. 
 The least disputed aspect of capacity in bioethics is 
that the concern of capacity arises out of respect for 
autonomy. A relevant theoretical question right from the 
start is why this principle is so particularly important. 
Susan Wolf observes that from its early beginnings, 
bioethics has been inundated with a distinctly Kantian 
individualism, one whereby the ability of individuals to 
reason toward their own personal decisions is held 
sacrosanct.3 Additionally, she notes that either by 
intention or convention, many bioethicists are content to 
take a principalist approach to all bioethical 
conversations. This approach is one taken by Beauchamp and 
Childress in their seminal work, Principles of Biomedical 
Ethics.4 It entails adopting “mid-level” principles and 
reasoning down to specific actions. As Jacob Rendtorff 
describes them, mid-level principles are ethical principles 
that fall between theoretical conceptions of “the good 
                                                        
3 Ibid. p. 293 
4 Tom L. Beauchamp, James F. Childress. Principles of 
Biomedical Ethics (7th ed. 2012). Oxford University Press. 
  8 
life” and ethical norms in concrete cases.5 For the 
principalists broadly speaking, autonomy is but one crucial 
bioethical principle. Depending on the account, it might 
take a leading role in determining how we prioritize and 
consider other principles, or it might compete evenly with 
other principles in our normative considerations. Beauchamp 
and Childress, for example, break bioethics down into 
principles of autonomy, beneficence, justice, and non-
maleficence. On the other hand, Elizabeth Anderson argues 
for a priority necessarily given to dignity, whereby 
respect for the dignity of the human life and human body is 
derivative of these other principles.6 So within 
principalists, while there is great difference over exactly 
how autonomy gets into the picture, and where it is 
situated relative to other principles, it has a place and 
therefore begets our present concerns about capacity. 
 I have told only a very cursory tale about autonomy 
and the way it is viewed by bioethics as a discipline. And 
as we will see later, there are theorists who reject the 
                                                        
5 Jacob Dahl Rendtorff. “Basic ethical principles in 
European bioethics and biolaw: Autonomy, dignity, 
integrity, and vulnerability—Towards a foundation of 
bioethics and biolaw.” Medicine, Health Care, and 
Philosophy, vol. 5, ed. 3 (2002) pp. 235. 
6 Elizabeth M. Anderson. “Bioethics at the Beginning, 
Middle, and End of Life.” Notre Dame Journal of Law, 
Ethics, and Public Policy, vol. 17 ed. 1 (2003) pp. 1. 
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principalists’ starting point, but now I turn to the more 
specific discussion about what capacity actually is.  The 
above discussion about autonomy does not strictly apply to 
decision-making capacity, because capacity is but one issue 
that derives from autonomy as a principle. As already 
broadly defined, someone deemed to have DMC is allowed to 
make her own decisions while someone deemed lacking 
sufficient capacity has decisions made for her either by a 
doctor or by a surrogate decision maker. Paul Applebaum is 
one of several theorists that hold that, for a patient to 
be deemed as having DMC, he actually needs four things: 
Ability to communicate effectively; 
Ability to reason and deliberate about medical choices; 
Ability to understand information presented; 
Ability to appreciate the medical consequences of 
decisions.7 
 
In this case, evaluation of a patient could deem the 
patient incapable of making medical decisions for lacking 
any one of these abilities.  
 Another important aspect of DMC is that it is a 
property of degree. Imagine an elderly patient with 
moderate to severe dementia, which as a result is 
frequently unable to understand where he is. Many doctors 
might be willing to accept that this patient cannot make                                                         
7 Paul S. Applebaum. “Assessment of Patients’ Competence to 
Consent to Treatment.” The New England Journal of Medicine, 
vol. 357 (2007) pp. 1834. 
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sufficiently informed decisions about whether or not to 
approve a very invasive treatment for cancer, but might 
still have enough awareness to reasonably refuse 
acetaminophen for minor pain. This brief example 
illustrates what is known as the proportionality aspect of 
capacity. The basic idea here is that as the gravity of the 
decision increases, so does the level of capacity we expect 
an individual to have in order to be allowed to make that 
decision. Regardless of our justification for 
proportionality, it is another aspect of capacity that 
bioethicists generally embrace despite other theoretical 
differences.8 This notion of capacity as a matter of degree 
renders it distinctly different from another close concept, 
that of competency. Often in the literature, capacity for 
making decisions and competency to stand trial are 
conflated.9 Equally prevalent, however, is the tendency to 
use them as distinct concepts. As I use them here, capacity 
is a matter of degree and applies to an individual’s 
ability to make various decisions. Often I will speak of 
sufficient capacity as a means of noting that the patient 
has a mental capacity sufficient for the decision in 
                                                        
8 Alec Buchanan. “Mental capacity, legal competence and 
consent to treatment.” Journal of the Royal Society of 
Medicine, vol. 97 (September 2004) pp. 415 
9 Ibid. 
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question. Competence, on the other hand, is used here as a 
legal concept that indicates a person is competent to 
communicate with his lawyer at a reasonably rational level, 
and able to comprehend the facts of the proceedings at 
hand.10 As I discuss below, maintaining this distinction is 
a necessary aspect of appropriate assessment for capacity 
in hospital patients. Given that the legal system is prone 
to evaluating competence as a yes/no binary, and medical 
practitioners are likely to evaluate their patients along a 
spectrum (of more or less capacity pertaining to more or 
less serious medical decisions) the two concepts seem 
destined not to match up. For now, I maintain the two 
concepts as separate; however, later I will consider 
whether or not the two concepts can in fact be unified. 
B. Assessing Patient Decision Making Capacity 
 If determining patient capacity were an easy matter, 
the issue would have significantly less print in the 
bioethical literature. As it is, trying to determine 
patient capacity and respect patient autonomy with regards 
to the patient’s best interest is likely to leave many 
clinicians dissatisfied. The assessment of capacity is a 
                                                        
10 Paul G. Nestor, Dawn Daggett, Joel Haycock, Marilyn 
Price. “Competence to Stand Trial: A Neuropsychological 
Inquiry.” Law and Human Behavior, vol. 23, no. 4 (1999) pp. 
397. 
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difficult one to get “right” in many cases, and given that 
it comes in degrees, there is not often a well defined 
cutoff point at which someone can merely be deemed as 
sufficient capacity, especially in cases of mental disorder 
where it is unclear exactly which individual capacities the 
disorder affects.11 In this section, I examine some of the 
literature on common problems with assessing DMC in 
patients as well as some of the proposed avenues of 
augmenting capacity assessments. First I examine the 
occurrence of different assessments of capacity in the same 
patient by different medical professionals. Second I will 
discuss some of the present methods for assessing a 
patient’s DMC. Lastly, I will discuss some of the proposed 
ways forward in assessing DMC via neuropsychological 
approaches. 
 Assessing capacity in patients need not always be a 
formal venture. In fact, the vast majority of cases present 
clinicians with obvious assessments of their patients’ DMC 
or else no reason to question it initially.12 Unfortunately 
there are many complicated and borderline cases where the 
informal assessment of the physician is insufficient and a 
                                                        
11 Ibid. 
12 Buchanan, 2004.  
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special assessment of capacity must take place.13 As 
physicians become more aware of the profoundly ethical 
nature of capacity assessments, bioethicists are called 
upon more frequently to provide additional analysis and 
consultation regarding difficult capacity assessments. One 
recent article examined the common disagreement that 
bioethicists and psychiatrists frequently have when 
determining a patient’s DMC.14 Once the assessment of 
capacity moves beyond the attending physician, it is 
usually the psychiatrist that first administers the 
assessment, with a bioethicists adding an additional 
opinion or being a “tie-breaker.” While many psychiatrists 
and bioethicists are willing to use capacity and competency 
interchangeably, the authors observed that the two groups 
were often employing the two concepts separately when they 
came to disagreement about a particular patient. Often the 
psychiatrists were concerned with evaluating legal 
competency while the bioethicists evaluated medical DMC. 
Brought into conversation about evaluative standard, the                                                         
13 One quite unfortunate fact is that these almost 
exclusively happen when a patient refuses a suggested 
treatment, which raises the question of whether or not 
capacity assessments might be a sort of gateway to a “new 
paternalism.” 
14 P. L. Schneider, K. A. Bramstedt. “When psychiatry and 
bioethics disagree about patient decision making capacity 
(DMC). Journal of Medical Ethics. Vol. 32 (August, 2005) 
pp. 90. 
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two could often reconcile their evaluations. Indeed, some 
of the most troubling cases were ones where the 
psychiatrists and bioethicists ultimately agreed that the 
patient lacked DMC yet likely retained a competency 
sufficient to hold up in court. Clearly in these cases the 
problem troubling medical professionals is whether the 
medical considerations in capacity are sufficient to 
justify one action that, legally, they may not have 
recourse to if the patient can prove legal competency. As 
long as these two concepts exists separately in practice, 
the best that can happen is for a more thorough testing 
measure to be adopted for capacity, one that will be able 
to more adequately inform questions and standards of 
competency as well. 
 Currently, there are many different instruments for 
testing, measuring, and assessing DMC in patients. Many of 
these rely on multiple point questionnaires that present 
patients with vignettes and relevant scenarios involving 
illness and treatment and assessing the reasonableness of 
patient responses.15 Several of the most consistent and 
trusted mechanisms take a good amount of clinical time to 
administer, and often are intended to be given at least 
informally across many points in time so as to account for                                                         
15 Applebaum, 2007. 
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fluctuations in the patient’s mental state as well as to 
allow clinicians to better understand the baseline mental 
functions for that patient Even the most reliable of these 
instruments, however, runs into several problems. .16 These 
instruments bias favorable results to those patients that 
are willing and capable of consistent verbal or written 
communication, which often might not be the case. It is 
almost impossible for any given score to be absolutely 
indicative of limited capacity, so other contextual factors 
will still have to be taken into account by the assessor. 
Additionally, if the assessor is not well versed in the 
scoring criteria, or merely misinterprets answers in a 
particular way, it is possible that she will score a 
patient differently than another assessor using the exact 
same instrument.17 Lastly, many recent feminists and race 
theorists critiques have looked at capacity assessments and 
found them remarkably lacking in contextual considerations 
appropriate to real patients. That is, several of the 
instruments seem to be blind to how race, gender, income or 
                                                        
16 Dilip V. Jeste, Laura B. Dunn, Barton W. Palmer, Elyn 
Saks, Maureen Halpain, Alison Cook, Paul Appelbaum, 
Lawrence Schneiderman. “A collaborative model for research 
on decisional capacity and informed consent in older 
patients with schizophrenia: Bioethics unit of a geriatric 
psychiatry intervention research center.” 
Psychopharmacology. (May, 2003) pp. 68. 
17 Wolf, 1994. 
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insurance status might significantly affect a patient’s 
responses regarding which treatments seem reasonable.18 
 As it becomes obvious that significantly more data 
needs to be collected, and more tests need to be 
administered in order for medical professionals to better 
understand capacity, other problems inevitably arise as 
well. One recent article from the Bioethics Council at UCSD 
looked at the need for more information regarding capacity 
in elderly patients with schizophrenia.19 The authors note 
that while elderly patients and patients with mental 
disorder make up the vast majority of capacity cases a 
bioethicists might see, very little has been studied about 
individuals that fit both demographics. Many concerns are 
especially heighted in this group, as the elderly are 
likely to have multiple medical conditions, and thus have 
multiple different prescriptions whose reactions with 
antipsychotics are unknown. Additionally, most capacity 
testing methods are developed on younger demographics, and 
so their efficacy with elderly patients is unproven. And 
ironically, the same capacity considerations that make them 
desirable test subjects also make them difficult ones to 
procure. IRB procedures for medical research require very 
                                                        
18 Ibid. 
19 Jeste et al., 2003. 
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explicitly informed consent, and the studies the authors 
desire to undertake are expressly about how to get informed 
consent from elderly patients with schizophrenia. Through 
repeated exposure to information on consent forms, as well 
as adapted means of presentation of critical and difficult 
portions of the forms, the researchers found they were able 
to significantly increase comprehension and retention of 
consent forms for research subjects. This finding supported 
their hypothesis that diminished capacity is not 
necessarily an irreversible state and that at least certain 
specific capacities can be augmented with improved 
presentation of information. 
 A second goal of this study was to use the findings to 
supplement the current capacity assessment instruments, or 
else devise a new one. One key aspect of informed consent 
in the studied demographic is discerning how much of the 
relevant information in the consent form is understood. 
Within many of the existing instruments, “failure to 
appreciate” pertinent information is often scored any time 
the patient disagrees with the physician’s intended course 
of action. This occurrence is troubling, as it seems likely 
to indicate a scoring bias that favors patients who agree 
with their physician over ones who do not. It is also 
indicative of a common misconception that formal assessment 
  18 
is only obligated when the patient disagrees with the 
doctor.20 However, many have argued that assessment of DMC 
should occur any time there is risk of cognitive 
impairment, and not only when disagreement occurs.21 As an 
important tool for addressing this problem, the researchers 
developed and piloted the California Scale of Appreciation 
(CSA), whereby clinicians explicitly measure a patient’s 
appreciation of relevant medical information based 
evaluating a patient’s beliefs about suggested practices 
and outcomes. Contrary to many current instruments, this 
test has yielded a high rate of consistency between 
assessors.22 
 This study indicates great need for more thorough and 
consistently administrable assessment mechanisms for 
discerning patient DMC. In an effort toward achieving this 
goal, many neuropsychologists have taken an increasing 
interest in DMC, and contend that neuropsychology has much 
useful input in the future of capacity questions. Karen 
Sullivan argues that there are many basic ways that                                                         
20 Buchanan, 2004. 
21 Linda Gazini, Ladislav Volicer, William A. Nelson, Ellen 
Fox, Arthur R. Derse. “Ten Myths About Decision-Making 
Capacity.” Journal of American Medical Directors, vol. 6 
(2005) pp. S100-S104. 
22 In some studies, clinicians asked to assess patients 
based on video interviews with patients performed no better 
than chance with regards to their consistency in 
evaluation. See Wolf (1994), Jeste et al. (2003). 
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neuropsychology can help DMC assessments. She notes there 
is still not a single and standardized method of 
assessment, and that rather than relying on physician 
questionnaires that vary wildly, a standardized model of 
what capacity actually entails might be able to drive a 
more consistent assessment mechanism. Her approach 
specifies conceiving of DMC assessment as a two-tiered 
process; the first tier is to assess general capacity and 
the second is to assess specific relevant capacities to the 
medical decision in question.23  
Other neuropsychologists have already taken a similar 
approach to the question of legal competency and made 
useful observations that could be relevant in medical DMC. 
In examining individuals committed to a Massachusetts 
psychiatric hospital, Nestor et al. evaluated patients with 
differing assessments of Competent to Stand Trial and 
Incompetent to Stand Trial along many various cognitive 
axes. These cognitive dimensions compared various cognitive 
and brain functions of the patients, with the theoretical 
assumption being that such functions represent important 
characteristics of specific sets of brain structures that 
interact to support higher level functions. Such an                                                         
23 Karen Sullivan. “Neuropsychological Assessment of Mental 
Capacity.” Neuropsychology Review, vol. 14 no. 3 (September 
2004) pp. 131. 
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approach might be used to understand specific cognitive 
capacities that are essential for higher-level functions, 
or at least to discover correlations between dysfunctional 
capacities and assessment of IST. One highly studied metric 
was that of comparing episodic and semantic memory across 
groups. Semantic knowledge is largely factual, and is 
heavily biased by cultural influences. Episodic memory is 
personal and confined to experiences that an individual had 
herself. Additionally, intelligence, attention and 
concentration, academic abilities and executive functions 
were all studied. These last two were found to have little 
to no correlation with assessment of IST or CST, while 
measures of verbal memory, attention, and social 
intelligence were all relatively good indicators of 
assessment outcome. These summarized results are telling: 
in determining legal competence, individual cognitive 
capacities appear to play a much greater role in 
determining assessment outcome than does mere knowledge of 
the current situation, recollection of facts, or academic 
skills; this finding is a desirable one as these last 
aspects are significantly affected by many social 
circumstances, as opposed to the highly correlated measures 
thought to be more internalized to the cognition of the 
individual in question. This seems to be a promising 
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connection between the concepts of legal competence and 
medical DMC moving forward. 
Neuropsychology assumes functional psychological 
models based on knowledge of brain systems, and generalizes 
from empirical data collected from subjects based on these 
models. Many have also argued for a more neuroscientific 
approach to DMC assessment, particularly in determining 
diagnosis of brain disorders like Minimally Conscious 
State.24 As opposed to cases of Persistent Vegetative State, 
where conscious awareness is never recoverable, MCS 
patients have some minimal level of awareness, and given 
the appropriate therapies are sometimes able to make 
dramatic, albeit slow, recoveries.25 One of these cases is 
dismally hopeless, yet the other might inspire a reasonable 
degree of hope from loved ones, and assuredly demands 
greater ethical considerations from physicians. We are 
currently aware of several instances where patients have 
been in undiagnosed MCS for years, during which time any 
number of egregious medical acts may have occurred. These 
could range from no or poor pain management, to basic and                                                         
24 Thomas Nadelhoffer, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong. “Neurolaw 
and Neuroprediction: Potential Promises and Perils.” 
Philosophy Compass, vol. 7 ed. 9 (2012) pp. 631. 
25 Eelco F. M. Wijdicks. “Minimally Conscious State vs. 
Persistent Vegetative State: The Case of Terry (Wallis) vs 
the Case of Terri (Schiavo).” Mayo Clinic Proceedings. 
(September, 2006) pp. 1155. 
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complete isolation of a partial consciousness. Undiagnosed 
MCS might reasonably be akin to medically induced solitary 
confinement. According to Joseph Fins, the first and 
greatest ethical duty we have to MCS patients is diagnosis 
of their condition, and requisite in this diagnosis is a 
decision about what and how much mental capacity a patient 
has.26 In our present clinical state, the best methods for 
such diagnosis appear to be functional neuro-imaging. This 
process uses brain-imaging techniques like functional MRI 
to examine which brain areas are active in a patient. 
Coupled with an adequate theory of functional brain areas, 
such imaging can yield a hypothesis about which cognitive 
functions a patient maintains, even if that patient is 
seemingly unconscious. Often, a MCS patient will not have 
any DMC, yet given the appropriate resources for recovery, 
it is possible that many such patients will eventually 
recover a great deal of their cognitive capacity. Given 
that such recovery necessarily occurs within the medical 
system, proper appraisal of DMC is essential throughout the 
recovery process.  
                                                        
26 Joseph J. Fins. “Affirming the right to care, preserving 
the right to die: Disorders of consciousness and 
neuroethics after Schiavo.” Palliative and Supportive Care, 
vol. 4 (2006) pp. 169. 
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Assessing capacity is a necessary part of ethical 
medicine. Yet the process of doing so currently faces many 
difficulties, and though there are equally many promising 
advances in our knowledge, the way forward remains vague. 
So far we have seen that much of the question over capacity 
lies in its assessment. Moreover, we have seen a prominent 
role for more empirical study into various issues regarding 
capacity. Next I want to consider one prominent position 
that takes the necessity for more empirical research 
further by demanding that we deliberately focus our 
intellectual concerns about DMC on empirical evidence and 
pragmatic practice. Susan M. Wolf’s view is a useful one to 
consider, because not only does she argue for pragmatic 
turn in questions of capacity, but in bioethics in general, 
and in doing so places much emphasis on the continued 
interaction between bioethics and law. Following a 
discussion of her view, I argue that theory and philosophy 
must remain an equally pertinent discipline of bioethics, 
and that DMC is not a notion that can function in a 
philosophical vacuum as Wolf might imagine it can. 
C. Turning Toward A Bioethics of Law 
In this section, I consider two arguments made by 
Susan Wolf: the first is that bioethics is in the midst of 
and should embrace a pragmatic turn; the second is an 
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argument for an increased bioethics of law—that is, a 
scheme in which bioethical principles and concerns greatly 
inform and drive bioethical legislation, rather than 
bioethics merely being beholden to the law for enforcement. 
The turn to pragmatism in her view is motivated by new 
considerations seemingly unanswerable by traditional 
bioethical theory combined with the apparent usefulness of 
empirical inquiry into many bioethical problems. The 
argument for an increased bioethics of law motivates from 
consideration of the historical and necessary link between 
the fields of law and medicine within bioethics. These 
arguments will be taken in turn. 
In bioethics, Wolf observes that there is an 
increasingly strong movement away from principalism, a 
movement she sees as coupled with a strong turn to 
pragmatism.27 Recall that principalism within bioethics is 
the selection of specific “mid-level” principles that 
govern norms in specific cases. In general, principalism 
assumes that the specified principles should always be 
upheld, with rare exceptions occurring when two or more 
principles conflict. Necessarily, principalism is highly 
ideal; it condenses an infinite number of highly specific 
ethical situations into a handful of broad principles that                                                         
27 Wolf, 1994. 
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must always be observed. Generally speaking, patient 
autonomy is often considered the most important principle—
that is—the most basic principalists assumption is often 
that all patients should make their own informed decisions 
when possible. Movement away from principalism in general 
has profound effect on our considerations of DMC, since the 
general approach to assessing DMC in practice is to assume 
autonomy and ask questions later. Rejection of principalism 
is motivated from many considerations. The first is that 
principalism tends to heavily idealize situations, and this 
heavy degree of idealization misses or ignores important 
contextual information about gender, race, class, and 
insurance status that all weigh heavily in medical decision 
making. To put the consideration bluntly, the current 
bioethics is one of privilege, where often the cases that 
are considered as theoretically relevant assume a patient 
has a specific educational, familial, and socio-economic 
background as well as completely glosses the issue of 
whether or not or how much a patient is insured. 
Decontextualizing bioethics into highly ideal theory seems 
to be problematic.  
However, this objection is not specific only to 
bioethics, but is one seen across many philosophical 
disciplines, and even within bioethics it does not seem 
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particular just to our issue of DMC. The relevant issue 
arises when we start to assume patient autonomy as a 
starting point, and we equally assume a certain kind of 
reasonable or rational decision making, but then ignore 
contextual factors that often constrain the kinds of 
decision a patient could make, even were she completely 
“reasonable.” Furthermore, empirical studies of physicians 
and their justifications for decisions about patient 
capacity tend to heavily indicate that bioethical 
principles seem to rarely drive decision making, but rather 
are invoked as post hoc justification for decisions already 
made. So a more specific argument is that principalism 
seems ill suited to the bioethical arena; it defines 
parameters of debate but does not prescribe how decisions 
should be made, nor does it effectively account for 
“emotions and realities” of decision making. Lastly, even 
if our principle of autonomy is applied correctly and 
effectively, deeming a patient incapable of making medical 
decisions comes with its own problems. Other studies have 
shown that in surrogate decision making for medical issues, 
surrogates perform little better than chance at making 
decisions that patients would make themselves had they 
retained the capacity to make them. Related to this 
occurrence is the fact that many patients do not even 
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desire to make autonomous decisions, but would rather their 
physicians act on and use their best judgment; these 
patients place particularly high emphasis on the 
professional and specialist role of the physician. Both of 
these final objections underline how autonomy may not be 
that desirable a principle in the first place, and that 
even if it is, it may not be one that can be consistently 
or justifiably practiced. Hence, we see the problem with 
starting from midlevel principles without defending the 
adoption of those principles in the first place. Many 
bioethicists are content to assert principles or explain 
how they work but the defense of midlevel principles often 
seems to stand on rather unstable foundation, or else a 
foundation that is unfortunately shallow. 
The goal, then, on Wolf’s view is not to augment or 
adapt our theory, but rather to move toward a more 
developed pragmatic empiricism with regards to bioethics. 
Empirical studies, she argues, are capable of demonstrating 
bias, considering contextual social issues, and reporting 
statistical results that reflect the way issues are 
actually decided. To consider another example, Wolf points 
to advanced directives. These are supported on the 
principalist account by a notion that in the event of 
diminished capacity, a patient has already determined 
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several medical decisions at a time when his capacity was 
not diminished. However, researchers have shown a great 
degree of variation in how patients intend the instructions 
in these documents to be upheld—i.e. strictly versus 
loosely—and many doubt whether an advanced directive can be 
said to be a direct extension of a patient’s agency at all. 
Wolf sees a similar turn happening in the legal 
context in addition to the bioethical one. Her fear is that 
if we make laws first, and then seek out our data later, we 
run the risk of making laws that do not align with the 
situation as it stands. The greatest problem with a legal 
down approach is that it often does not translate well to 
clinical practice.28 She points to many instances where 
health law has been made independent of bioethical 
considerations, often driven by public or political 
morality rather than clinical observation, and subsequently 
the laws have significantly restricted the efficacy of 
medical providers. In some cases, such as criminalizing 
drug addiction in pregnant women, an empirically unverified 
ethical principle drives a legal decision that then harms 
patients; women and their fetuses are harmed when women are 
discouraged from seeking appropriate medical care during 
pregnancy. Because of this and similar instances, she                                                         
28 Wolf, 2004. 
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argues, we must attain a bioethics of law in addition to 
our current law of bioethics. 
A bioethics of law, on Wolf’s view, “would involve 
asking […] whether we are using law responsibly in pursuit 
of ethics goals.”29 Results from clinical practice would 
then not only be used to formulate laws at the outset, but 
laws would also be held accountable to their consequences 
in clinical practice in a way we do not currently see. The 
hope would be to have a legal structure that is affected by 
bioethics to a similar degree that bioethics is affected by 
law; such a structure would necessitate greater bioethical 
input at the lawmaking level. Considering this argument, 
principalism does seem insufficient, but it is hard to see 
how Wolf offers a sound alternative. She argues that we 
should engage in ground up, inductive, and empirical 
reasoning about bioethical principles and practices as 
opposed to top or mid-level down deduction from principles 
to norms. Below, I argue that she is only half right, and 
that top down theorizing is necessary for bottom up 
induction to have any relevance in bioethics. With issues 
of capacity, certain philosophical conversations are 
necessary for any empirical or legal outcome to make sense. 
                                                         
29 Ibid. pp. 300 
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D. An Interdisciplinary Approach to Understanding Capacity 
Susan Wolf probably does not see philosophers having a 
long and continued involvement in the bioethical discussion 
about capacity. Concluding her discussion of bioethics and 
health law, she says: 
“We can continue in both fields down the well trod road of 
conversations among experts, governed by top-down theory 
and the elegance of abstract pronouncements, largely 
inattentive to differences of race, ethnicity, gender, and 
insurance status. Or we can head down a different path, one 
more winding and complex. This is a path shaped by the 
twists and turns of empiricist investigation, with detailed 
attention to context.” 
 
In considering and responding to Wolf, I reject this 
dichotomy of options in favor of a third possibility. 
Rather than concluding that the failures and shortcomings 
of principalism means we should reject top down theorizing, 
I contend that we need to bring top down theorizing into 
constant conversation with ground up empirical research. 
 To begin with, I am not sure that Wolf has rejected 
principalism as sufficiently as she thinks she has. I agree 
that any bioethical view that begins by stipulating a 
principle will quickly find itself in some hot water, but 
in order to reject the principle of autonomy, say, there 
might be more to the story than the highly impoverished 
notion of autonomy Wolf characterizes. That is to say, at 
most, by pointing out relevant shortcomings of the current 
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conception of autonomy alongside feminists and race 
theorists, the most that Wolf has done is shift the burden 
of the argument back to the principalists. It is quite 
possible that a wider and more socially conscious 
conception of Beauchamp’s and Childress’ principles could 
encompass the objections she raises. Indeed, someone 
adhering to their model might not even have to revise much, 
but rather might contend that all of her socially based 
objections to autonomy can be addressed by the principle of 
justice in its current formulation. 
 Wolf has shifted the burden of argument to 
principalists, and it is plausible that they have a 
reasonable response to her concerns. I am hesitant to agree 
with the principalists, still, however, on grounds of 
political coercion. Wolf acknowledges that our bioethics 
laws are as equally coercive in nature as any others. 
Without diverging greatly from the discussion at hand, I 
think principalism is going to run into the problem of 
public reason in justifying bioethics laws. This is not to 
say that principalists are particularly coercive, but 
rather to say that bioethics necessarily acts through the 
arm of the law, and as such, it seems that a principalists 
defense of any law will be more difficult to justify 
publicly. That is, I see an easy Rawlsian response to 
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principalist bioethicists arguing that starting with a 
basic ethical principle might not be publicly justifiable 
in a reasonably pluralistic society. A similar criticism 
might just be that the principalist seems arbitrary in 
deciding on some principles and not others. Responding to 
either of these objections requires the principalists to 
justify the first ethical principle, but if he is capable 
of doing this, then it is unclear why we started with that 
principle in the first place instead of the principle that 
justifies it.  
 Even if we agree with Wolf and reject principalism in 
bioethics, we are still not committed to taking on a 
heavily empiricist and pragmatic view of bioethics. In 
fact, I am not sure that she could do so herself. To 
elucidate this point, I want to again consider the 
distinction between legal competency and medical DMC. Close 
examination yields somewhat distinct differences in our 
interests for deciding either state. In the case of legal 
competency, we are often concerned with deciding whether a 
defendant can be held criminally liable for his actions. 
With DMC, we are concerned with giving the utmost respect 
to the desires of the patient. These aims appear quite 
different. However, one obvious similarity is that both 
considerations require a level of acceptable communication 
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and understanding between a layperson and a professional. 
It seems like these considerations are possibly derivative 
from the same basic consideration about what sort of power 
a specialist or professional has over a layperson without 
the same body of knowledge. This consideration actually 
agrees with Wolf when she says that bioethics must always 
be concerned with power relations.30 However, at a deeper 
level, underlying both of these concepts is a concern with 
enabling the layperson to make her own decision without 
being wrongfully coerced by the professional. At this deep 
level, what we are concerned about truly is who is 
responsible for the decision at hand. So ultimately our 
notion of legal competency and our notion of medical DMC 
are predicated on some understanding of agent 
responsibility, namely, an account of what it is that makes 
an agent able to be held responsible for an action. 
 The question of agent responsibility is one that 
philosophers have weighed in on for a long time, and an 
issue with which they frequently enter into discourse with 
legal scholars, and more recently with various cognitive 
scientists. It makes sense that the same academic players 
interested in how we account for agent responsibility are 
also interested in the biomedical issue of capacity, as the                                                         
30 Wolf, 1994. 
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latter is derivative from the former. Given the apparent 
importance of agent responsibility on notions of capacity, 
much more will be said in the next chapter about agent 
responsibility and how it relates to the specific 
discussion at hand. 
 Going forward, it looks like philosophers, cognitive 
scientists, bioethicists, medical practitioners, and 
legislators all will continue to have much to say about 
medical DMC. Importantly, it looks like no single 
discipline is going to have the final say. Whereas 
philosophers are responsible for figuring out what our 
conceptual framework actually entails, and maybe even what 
the deeper ethical implications might be for our bioethical 
principles, it is easy for the degree of abstraction 
present in philosophical theorizing to be very far from the 
experience of the people whose lives we ultimately affect 
when we do bioethics. Cognitive scientists will likely play 
an enormous role in providing empirical data to ground or 
refute our theoretical conceptions, but must realize that 
the sort of data they collect will always be subject to 
interpretation, and reliant on theory for connection to 
real meaning. Bioethicists will likely continue to be a 
pair of boots on the ground, as it were, trying to 
integrate and apply lessons from the other disciplines, as 
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well as weighing theory and empirical evidence with actual 
pragmatic decision making with real patients. Medical 
practitioners inevitably bear the brunt of tough decision-
making, and ultimately all of the other disciplines are 
failing if they do not provide physicians with effective 
theoretical, physical, and practical tools for evaluating 
patient DMC. And lastly, all of this is little more than 
ink on paper without the enforcement of the law to back up 
our concerns and protect patients and physicians when 
medical decisions are made. 
E. Capacity and Competency 
 Up to this point, I have been primarily arguing for a 
model of interaction between the disciplines involved in 
bioethical discussion of decision-making capacity. Before 
moving to the next chapter, I want to take more time to 
fully address the capacity/competency distinction. As 
already mentioned, there is great ambiguity in literature 
and in practice with regards to these terms. Moving 
forward, it seems that both terms must be used synonymously 
or else as separate terms entirely to avoid continued 
confusion. I shall argue that the two terms most reasonably 
mean distinctly different things, and that they should be 
differentiated in legal practice. 
 To briefly recap the common use distinctions of the 
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terms, competency typically refers to an individual’s 
ability to stand trial and is often a binary ruling by the 
court. In many cases there might be distinctions 
determining an individual competent to stand trial, but not 
to self represent, or even distinctions that juvenile 
defendants are or are not competent to stand trial as an 
adult. While competency examinations pertain to something 
mental about the defendant, the typically binary nature of 
the ruling makes it an ill suited concept for mentally ill 
defendants that might have predominantly intact mental 
faculties, but suffer from delusions that only inhibit 
particular types of decision making. As I will argue in the 
next chapter, it is possible that specific mental disorder 
symptoms might affect cognitive processes in a specific 
enough way that an individual is competent to stand trial, 
and additionally that diminished capacity and criminal 
insanity defense do not seem to fully capture the nature of 
the situation. 
 With regards to the concept of mental capacity, 
especially as it is used in bioethical DMC, we have a term 
that is applied in degrees. Someone can have the capacity 
to make a decision to take ibuprofen, but not have the 
capacity to say yes or no to brain surgery. The flexibility 
of this concept makes it significantly more useful, as it 
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allows us to aim for the most specific analysis of the 
person in question. Recall Wolf’s desire for us to 
contextualize our bioethics to the individual patient. 
Moving toward a capacity centric model as opposed to a 
competency centric one would be a dramatic step in that 
direction. As neuroscience and cognitive science develop 
increasingly better testing mechanisms, both imaging and 
functional, it seems highly likely that capacity 
measurements will get more accurate and become more readily 
available. With this in mind, my hopes are twofold: First, 
I endeavor that mental capacity become a more heavily 
theorized legal concept so that it might replace the notion 
of competency altogether; Second, I believe that such a 
concept of capacity has dramatically useful application in 
realms outside of bioethics, such as criminal law. In the 
next chapter, I aim to explore one of these, namely in 
positing an improved scheme for evaluating mentally ill 
defendants.31 
 
 
 
                                                        
31 For a classic example of a challenge to DMC, see the 
attached newspaper clipping from the Pittsburg Post 
Gazzette from May 9, 1978 for a brief recap of the infamous 
Mary Northern case. 
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Chapter II 
Schizophrenia and Capacity for Mens rea 
 
 In our legal system, there are three common 
evaluations of defendants suffering mental disorders that 
serve to determine legal responsibility. The one that is 
more commonly recognized in our society is the legal 
insanity defense whereby a defendant attempts to prove that 
his mental disorder prohibited or affected his 
understanding of his actions or their moral wrongness. Much 
can and probably should be said about the insanity defense 
and the ways it possibly fails to account for the 
experience of some mental disorders or their symptoms, but 
the insanity defense itself is not the focus of this 
chapter so much as positing a possible alternative to it. A 
second way our legal system acknowledges mental illness in 
criminal cases is through the diminished capacity plea. 
These two differ significantly. The insanity defense is 
essentially a not guilty plea, whereby if deemed guilty the 
defendant is sentenced to psychological hospitalization 
rather than criminal punishment. The diminished capacity 
plea is one that accepts criminal liability, but requests 
mitigated punishment based on diminished mental capacity. 
This plea already sounds very much like the intended 
subject of this paper, even employing the word capacity. 
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However, what I argue for in this chapter is a more 
significant understanding of mental capacity whereby lack 
of appropriate mental capacity might be sufficient not only 
to mitigate sentencing, but sufficient to rule out criminal 
liability altogether. The difference between this scheme 
and criminal insanity is that I argue that such an 
evaluation of mental capacity can and, for many mentally 
ill defendants, often should, take place at the outset of 
court proceedings. Specifically, I argue that an evaluation 
of defendants for mental capacity relative to mens rea 
might be able to excuse some mentally ill defendants from 
criminal liability. 
 Mens rea is the notion of the “guilty mind” or 
criminal intent of an action. While an individual might be 
responsible for an act, he is not thought be criminally 
responsible unless there was also a relevant mental or 
intentional state that the act do some sort of harm. The 
reason mens rea is in particular need of evaluation is 
because insanity defense cases presuppose that the 
defendant did in fact have the requisite guilty or 
intentional state of mind. However, there are specific 
symptoms in some mental disorders that seem not to be 
captured by current applications of mens rea. In 
particular, I will examine schizophrenia and some of its 
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symptoms with the aim of showing that very important 
theoretical objections might be raised as to whether or not 
the schizophrenic defendant is capable of forming a 
requisite mens rea. The goal is to provide a case for 
adopting a conception of mental capacity as it applies to 
mens rea with the hopes of showing that some mental 
disorder symptoms may prohibit the relevant mens rea from 
ever forming. 
This argument will proceed in several steps. The first 
will be to offer a theoretical and philosophical account of 
some of the schizophrenic symptoms that seem not to fit 
under our current tests for mens rea. Secondly, I consider 
some ways in which mens rea is currently used in our 
courtrooms and how those might be inadequate. Importantly 
then, the third part of my argument is that neuroscience 
and neuroscientific data will be necessary in the courtroom 
to substantiate the claims of defendants incapable of mens 
rea by means of their schizophrenic symptoms. Let us then 
turn to the theoretical framework that upon which we will 
build later sections. 
A. A Philosophical and Psychological Account 
Before we can begin our theoretical account of why 
schizophrenic symptoms might conflict with mens rea, we 
need first broaden our philosophical scope. In considering 
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questions of legal responsibility, I assume that any viable 
theory must itself be constrained in a broader theory of 
responsibility per se.  In particular, in criminal cases we 
are concerned with agent responsibility, the condition that 
an individual acts in such as manner as to be responsible 
for the occurrence of that action. Additionally, I have 
already alluded to questions of capacity being necessarily 
bound up in theories of agent responsibility. Therefore, I 
must first offer a working account of agent responsibility. 
Once that account is in place, I give a cognitive 
neuropsychological account of schizophrenia and how that 
account fits into agent responsibility. Then I will outline 
two of the many possible schizophrenic symptoms and how 
they might give insight into the question of mens rea. 
Lastly, I will argue how capacity for mens rea is 
compromised by some schizophrenic symptoms, and briefly 
suggests some limitations on what sorts of symptoms might 
be exculpating of mens rea. 
i. Agent Responsibility 
I assume that any functional conception of legal 
responsibility must fit within a plausible and applicable 
theory of general responsibility—that is, a theory of what 
entails responsibility of an agent for his actions. To 
proceed along this line of reasoning, I will make two 
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qualifications: the first is that responsibility 
necessitates a conception of freedom of will, which I will 
address and support momentarily; the second is that we need 
only be concerned with responsibility per se in this 
context so far as it encompasses our objectives—legal 
insanity and schizophrenia. That is, I recognize that agent 
responsibility has many forms and theories behind it, but I 
only address a very narrow conception of it relative to 
this argument. Before I argue for a theory of 
responsibility, then, let me set the stage by offering the 
theory of freedom of will upon which it will be built. For 
this theory, I turn to Harry Frankfurt. 
Harry Frankfurt32 gives an account of free will that, 
in light of various arguments for determinism, argues that 
freedom of the will is based not upon desires of the first 
order, but rather volitions of the second order. First 
order desires are our every day wants and inclinations such 
as “Stacy wants ice cream.” Second order desires are 
desires about desires like “Stacy does not want to want ice 
cream.” On Frankfurt’s account, what is necessary for 
freedom of will is complete freedom of second order 
                                                        
32 Frankfurt, Harry. “Freedom of the Will and the Concept of 
a Person.” Journal of Philosophy. 68/1 (1971) 5-20. 
Reprinted in Free Will. 2nd ed. Watson, Gary. Oxford 
University Press, 2003. p. 322-336. 
  43 
volitions—the freedom to will what you want to will—and 
this freedom of will is analogous to freedom of action—
being free to act how you want to act. This sort of second 
order freedom is necessary, by Frankfurt’s account, for the 
very conception of what it means to be a person. An 
individual may not be a person but may, in fact, be a 
“wanton” if he lacks any second order volitions or if his 
freedom to will is hindered or obstructed. In either case, 
we would say that the wanton is unfree. One other crucial 
aspect of Frankfurt’s conception of personhood and freedom 
is that to be a person, one must have rationality and must 
have the ability to apply that rationality to his desires, 
thus rendering him capable of second order volitions and 
not merely second order desires. All of that is to say that 
a wanton might be capable of second order desires, “Stacy 
does not want to want ice cream,” but without the ability 
to evaluate and will those desires, the wanton remains 
unfree and not a person in the conceptual, morally relevant 
sense. 
 Susan Wolf captures Frankfurt’s sense of second order 
volitions as necessary for freedom and extrapolates that 
sense to account for responsibility. She argues that to be 
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responsible, an agent must also be sane.33 The idea of a 
“deep self” advocated by Frankfurt and others allows us to 
understand how some individuals might be held less 
blameworthy for their actions despite having apparent 
desires to act. Sanity, on Wolf’s view, assumes a certain 
rational connection with the world and relevant 
environmental factors. The augmented “sane deep-self” view 
of responsibility that she advocates then integrates 
several points. The agent responsible for his actions must 
have a sane deep-self whereby he is rationally connected to 
the world and able to respond appropriately to 
environmental stimuli—an agent responsible for his actions 
must first be responsible for his mental and intentional 
states.34 One necessary condition for that responsibility is 
freedom of second order volitions in the Frankfurtian 
sense, but a second necessary condition is the ability to 
constantly evaluate and improve second order volitions. 
Wolf recognizes determinists might claim that various 
                                                        
33 Wolf Susan. “Sanity and the Metaphysics of 
Responsibility.” In Responsibility, Character, and the 
Emotions. 46-62. Cambridge University Press. 1987. 
Reprinted in Free Will. 2nd ed. Watson, Gary. Oxford 
University Press, 2003. p. 372-387. 
34 This is not to argue that to be responsible for one’s 
actions, one must always act rationally or responsibly, but 
rather to say that there is always an ability for one to 
rationally adapt one’s second order desires in a way that 
is relevant to environmental stimuli.  
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factors make our deep selves unavoidable, or predisposes us 
to certain second order volitions. However, on her view 
determinism does not pose an imminent threat since sanity 
requires only the ability to evaluate and improve second 
order volitions rather than any particular second order 
volitions. It is the mistakenness of second order volitions 
in insane individuals that makes them not responsible, not 
the unavoidable nature of their volitions. Therefore, any 
individual that is not capable of both willing what he 
wants to will and also capable of evaluating and improving 
such volitions is not responsible. 
 George Graham argues that mental disorder, as a 
concept, can be understood along these lines.35 In 
considering how mental disorders come about, Graham 
recognizes roughly seven categories of cognition that might 
be affected or deficient in mental disorder. We can 
consider a couple of them here. Regarding self/world 
comprehension, Graham states, 
“[…] without knowing whether the food in my refrigerator is 
poisonous, if my car is safe to drive, whether my neighbors 
are trustworthy, or if the hot cup of coffee on my kitchen 
counter is too hot to hold, my ignorance is dangerous and 
deleterious.” 
  
And regarding bodily/spatial self location he says, 
 
                                                        
35 Graham 2010, pp. 144, 145 
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“We persons must be able to identify our somatic or bodily 
position in the environment/the world, so that we can 
utilize our motor capacities in the service of bodily 
movement and self-maintenance as well as other forms of 
goal pursuit.” 
 
And individual with a disorder of self/world comprehension 
is not able to will what he wants to will. A schizophrenic 
with paranoid delusions might be convinced his neighbor 
works for the CIA and is spying on him. This individual may 
not be able to maintain a reasonable second order volition 
regarding how he understands his neighbor. Someone with 
disruption in her bodily/spatial self-location might not be 
able to improve second order volitions regarding how 
appropriate is the thought, “This arm is attached to my 
body, sure, but it is not mine.” Regarding delusional 
schizophrenic patients, Graham says, 
“Understanding the phenomenon of delusion requires 
understanding a deluded subject’s failure to control or 
direct their own cognitive activities in a satisfactory and 
prudent or reason-responsive manner.” 
 
That control or direction refers to the second order 
volition itself, and the qualification of “in… a reason 
responsive manner” recognizes the need to be able to 
improve second order volitions based on rational 
reflection. It is apparent, then, how this Frankfurt/Wolf 
model might be used to appraise certain schizophrenic 
symptoms. It is also useful to see, as in the example 
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above, how certain premises of the Frankfurt/Wolf model of 
responsibility are already incorporated into existing 
accounts of mental disorder and schizophrenic symptoms. 
 Additionally, I said above that notions of capacity 
and competency are both preceded by an underlying idea of 
agent responsibility. The very idea of assigning legal 
blame is predicated upon assigning that blame to someone. 
To do so, we must have conditions that prescribe 
blameworthiness. If we are evaluating someone for legal 
competency, or a capacity to make decisions, or in the case 
of this chapter, a capacity to even form a requisite mental 
state, then it is already assumed that we are trying to 
decide whether or not to blame them, or how much blame we 
can hold them accountable for. Even the principalist makes 
this assumption when invoking the principle of autonomy. In 
that case, the aim is to enable the patient to be as 
responsible as possible for the decision being made. 
Broadly speaking, when we seek to excuse an individual of 
responsibility on mental grounds, we do it in one of three 
ways, according to Carl Elliot. We either say that in 
individual was somehow ignorant of relevant factors of her 
actions, or we say that an individual was mentally 
unhealthy enough as to have been compelled to act as she 
did. The third option is for a person to be so mentally 
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unfit as to fall outside of the realm of responsibility 
altogether. In all three of these cases, what is somehow 
lacking is an individual’s intent to commit the act.36 
However, we must be careful to note that when we speak of 
intention here, what we are speaking of is actually second 
order intention, and not first order intention. A deluded 
individual could very well intend to attack the person she 
perceives as an alien imposter of her spouse, but it is her 
second order intention that is compromised in this 
situation. An appropriate second order volition would be 
based on the environment relevant response (that the person 
in this situation is not an alien imposter, but actually 
her spouse). Thus the model still holds. 
ii. A Psychological Account 
As we turn now to consider philosophical and 
theoretical accounts of schizophrenia, we will keep in mind 
the Frankfurt/Wolf model of responsibility and sanity. Our 
objective is to understand one possible theoretical 
framework for schizophrenia broadly conceived so that in 
the next section we can look at specific symptoms of 
schizophrenia and understand how they diminish or abolish 
agent responsibility. The contention will be that                                                         
36 Elliot, Carl. The Rules of Insanity: Moral Responsibility 
and the Mentally Ill Offender. State University of New York 
Press. 1996. 
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responsibility is abolished because the capacity for reason 
responsive self-reflection does not exist. In large part, 
the following theory is that put forth by Christopher 
Frith. 
Frith argues that the disorder of schizophrenia 
presents as three component parts.37 Disorder of Willed 
Action is the first component. Schizophrenic patients, 
particularly those with negative symptoms, display 
truncated or impaired ability to act coherently, to execute 
plans, or to initiate action as opposed to mere stimulus 
response. Resulting are perseveration of action, 
inappropriate action, and poverty of action. Next is 
Disorder of Self-Monitoring. As opposed to willed action, 
this deficiency refers to inability to monitor or recognize 
willed intention. Such disorder results in many delusions 
and hallucinations experienced by schizophrenics. Lastly, 
Monitoring the Intentions of Others rounds out the 
characteristic defects of schizophrenics. Inability to 
appropriately recognize the intentions or beliefs of 
external agents leads to delusions and hallucinations as 
well, but often of a different kind.  
Admittedly, trying to reconcile all of these different 
categories of disorder and their respective symptoms seems                                                         
37 Frith, 1992, p. 122-124 
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difficult. Frith’s approach examines these individually in 
an attempt to find a single underlying cognitive mechanism 
that might be able to explain the whole breadth of 
schizophrenic symptoms. The single cognitive mechanism that 
he believes adequately accounts for the range of 
schizophrenic symptoms is metarepresentation. Meta-
representation is equally understood as second order 
thought. Second order thought, broadly conceived, is 
thought about other mental or intentional states. 
Corresponding to the three disorders within schizophrenia, 
Frith finds three possible categories of meta-
representation: knowing about goals, knowing about our own 
intentions, and knowing about the intentions of others. 
Deficiencies or errors in meta-representation lead to the 
symptoms experienced by schizophrenics: 
“… (1) [W]ithout awareness of goals there is poverty 
of will. This leads to negative and positive behavioral 
abnormalities; (2) without awareness of intentions there is 
a lack of high level self-monitoring. This leads to 
abnormalities in the experience of action; (3) with faulty 
awareness of the intentions of others there are delusions 
of persecution and delusions of reference,”  (Ibid. p. 125). 
 
Frith’s theory dovetails into our Frankfurt/Wolf 
notions of responsibility. If this theory holds, then the 
schizophrenic, in some aspect, cannot appropriately 
recognize shortcomings in second order volitions, cannot 
modify second order volitions with appropriate regard to 
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actual circumstances, or has no second order volitions at 
all. Any of these three deficiencies renders an individual 
not responsible for self, and therefore not responsible for 
his actions. Let us recall that to be responsible for self, 
and so also responsible for action, an individual must have 
second order volitions and must also be capable of 
improving them. In the following section, we will examine 
two of the many possible schizophrenic symptoms within our 
new expanded framework in order to demonstrate that some 
schizophrenics cannot be held morally, or perhaps 
criminally, responsible for certain of their actions. 
iii. Two Symptoms 
To see how this theoretical framework actually applies 
to real symptoms, we will now look at two of them: thought 
insertion and Capgras delusions. Thought insertion is just 
what it sounds like; it is the delusional belief that 
certain of one’s thoughts are actually inserted into one’s 
conscious awareness by an outside or alien consciousness. 
Capgras delusions are delusions of mistaken identity 
particularly applied to people or things that are close to 
the delusional individual. Both are positive symptoms of 
schizophrenia with relevant implications to our theory 
above. Each will be examined in turn before I have a brief 
word about delusional beliefs in general and then conclude 
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this section with some notes on schizophrenic symptoms more 
broadly. Throughout the chapter, I will return to these two 
symptoms to exemplify points, but I in no way intend to 
imply any greater import of these symptoms than of other 
schizophrenic symptoms. Similar arguments could be made 
from a whole host of possible symptoms of schizophrenia. 
That I choose to work with specifically these two symptoms 
is arbitrary. 
a. Thought Insertion 
“Thoughts are put into my mind like ‘Kill God.’ It is 
just like my mind working, but it isn’t. They come from 
this chap, Chris. They are his thoughts,” (Frith, 1992 p. 
66). The notion of a thought existing in our minds that is 
not ours is a difficult one to comprehend. Many theorists, 
therefore, have attempted to account for both the causation 
and the experience of inserted thoughts. One theory, though 
in some ways ambiguous, accounts for the experience of 
inserted thoughts as from an external source as follows: 
A person feels that a thought is alien because he cannot 
voluntarily control its occurrence in himself. 
 
This person also denies agency of this thought because he 
cannot explain the thought in terms of his own internal 
psychology. 
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This person then willfully ascribes the thought to another 
agent because it exhibits “recurrent subject-specific 
semantic content.”38 
 
Another theory, accounting for phenomenological experience 
of inserted thoughts hypothesizes that in the same way we 
can feel and identify a difference when we move our arm 
versus when someone else does it for us, there is a feeling 
of familiarity and recognition associated with thought 
also; schizophrenics experiencing delusions of thought 
insertion experience “inserted” thoughts (as opposed to 
thoughts they feel they are responsible for) with a similar 
phenomenological quality to when someone moves our arm for 
us versus when we initiate that movement ourselves.39 
 Where these and other theories interest us, with 
regards to agent responsibility, is in the way that they 
acknowledge the inability of the individual to improve upon 
second order thoughts. The individual experiencing inserted 
thoughts is experiencing a disorder of self-monitoring. 
More will be said about the possible mechanisms of this 
disorder later, but for now what is important is how this 
disorder relates to metrepresentational failure and our                                                         
38Graham, George and Stephens, G. Lynn. When Self 
Consciousness Breaks: Alien Voices and Inserted Thoughts. 
The MIT Press. 2000. 
 
39 Gray, David M. “Phenomenological Warrant and the 
Ascription of Thought.” Under Review. 
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necessary conditions for responsibility. Disorder of self-
monitoring in this case is the metarepresentational failure 
of the schizophrenic to monitor his own intentions. The 
thought disorder patient is unable to recognize certain 
thoughts as her own, and so ascribes the intentional states 
of those thoughts to other external consciousnesses. Let us 
look at a second symptom of schizophrenia, Capgras 
delusions, so that we might further understand our 
theoretical framework above and how it more specifically 
might relate to mens rea. 
b. Capgras Delusions 
Frith and Johnstone, (2003 p. 140) summarize the 
Capgras delusion as a “belief that a person has been 
replaced by an identical or almost identical other. The 
person who has been replaced is usually someone close the 
[delusional] patient…”40 Frith (1992) and Garety (1998) both 
acknowledge theories for Capgras and other delusions of 
misidentification that suggest the cognitive phenomenology 
is directly resultant from anatomical failures in certain 
types of information processing.41 In particular, they each 
                                                        
40 Frith, Christopher and Johnstone, Eve. Schizophrenia: A 
Very Short Introduction. Oxford University Press, 2003. 
 
41 Garety, Phillipa Garrety. “Insight and Delusions.” In 
Insight and Psychosis, 1998. Edited by Amador, Xavier F. 
and David, Anthony S. Oxford University Press. 1998. 
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cite Ellis and Young (1990) in their account that focuses 
on two particular pathways of facial processing: the first 
identifies faces as physical features and recognizes them 
based on information learned and stored in memory (e.g. my 
wife) while a second pathway is responsible for ascribing 
emotional content to faces of people that hold emotional 
connotations to us. In this way, the account suggests that 
there can be normal functioning in one stream of 
processing—the identification of a face—but failure in the 
another—my emotional attachment to the face of my wife—that 
leads a patient to experience a feeling of alienation or 
suspicion of the person that looks and seems like my wife, 
but does not feel like my wife. She does not trigger the 
emotional attachment that I associate with my wife when I 
see her, and so seems to be a different, albeit physically 
identical, person. 
Like the patient experiencing thought insertion, the 
Capgras patient experiences disorder of self-monitoring and 
failure to understand or represent his own internal mental 
states. The patient cannot adequately locate or understand 
the source of his altered experience of his loved one. 
While such delusions are often relatively inconsequential, 
“In one extreme case, a patient who believed his stepfather                                                         
 
  56 
had been replaced by a robot subsequently decapitated him 
to look for batteries and controls in his head,” (Frith and 
Johnstone, 2003). This case is very striking relative to 
our inquiry, as it seems that the delusion was in some way 
directly causally relevant to the patient’s action.  
B. Delusional Beliefs and Responsibility 
 Let us now return to the notion of responsibility. My 
argument that certain schizophrenic experiences reduce or 
absolve responsibility for action demands a certain 
standard of relevance. I intend in no way to argue that 
schizophrenia as a diagnosis precludes individuals from 
having a relevant mens rea to criminal prosecution, but 
rather that specific symptoms prohibit specific cognitive 
capacities necessary to form or hold a mens rea. For 
schizophrenic patient to be excused of responsibility for 
an action as result of any of his symptoms, they must be 
relevant to his actions in two very specific ways. The 
first is that the symptomatic mental state must actually 
relate to the crime. Hallucinating that all the dogs in the 
neighborhood work for the KGB to urinate in her yard would 
probably not excuse a paranoid schizophrenic for stabbing 
her former employer, for example. The second sort of 
relevance lies in how a symptom affects the mental states 
relevant to the act. In his seminal piece Alternate 
  57 
Possibilities and Moral Responsibility,42 Harry Frankfurt 
argues that, regarding moral responsibility for actions, “a 
person is not morally responsible for what he has done if 
he did it only because he could not have done otherwise,” 
(emphasis mine). In this case, since we consider 
individuals who are mentally ill, we will need to revise 
his thesis slightly. Drawing on our earlier recognition of 
Frankfurt, Wolf, and Frith, I suggest that a schizophrenic 
individual be excused of responsibility for an action if 
the causal mental state in question is relevant to the act 
and held only because he could not have willingly intended 
or thought otherwise, i.e. if disordered cognitive 
mechanisms prevent reason responsive evaluation of the 
thought. The schizophrenic symptom in question must have 
compromised his ability to evaluate or reasonably alter his 
second order volitions. In such a case, he is not morally 
responsible for his criminal act. 
The thought insertion patient above surely does not 
want to intend the thought “Kill God”, but the thought 
still occurs within his mind. He might even be capable of 
having second order thoughts about the delusions, but none 
of these thoughts lead him to recognition that the 
                                                        
42 Frankfurt, Harry. 1969. "Alternate Possibilities and 
Moral Responsibility." Journal of Philosophy 66: 829-839.  
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delusional belief is itself false. Even if the patient 
evaluates his own thoughts and arrives at a second order 
volition “I do not want be motivated to act by the thoughts 
Chris puts in my head,” that volition is still about an 
intentional state that does not actually exists because its 
subject does not exists either. This case violates our 
necessary condition for agent responsibility of being able 
to improve second order volitions in a reasonable manner, 
and so this individual is neither responsible for these 
thoughts, nor for himself. 
Imagine our Capgras patient that decapitated his 
stepfather. He committed this act because he did not have 
the capacity to recognize his father as that person. 
Obviously evaluation of any such desire by a rational 
individual would lead to an improvement of second order 
volitions, as reality suggests that an entity who looks and 
acts like his step-father is probably not a robot, is 
probably a person, should probably not be decapitated. This 
patient could not possess mens rea because he could not 
understand that his actions affected another person. In 
both of these cases, even if our patients have second order 
volitions, those volitions are not about entities that 
exist. Individuals that hold second order volitions about 
non-existent entities, and have no way of evaluating or 
  59 
improving those volitions with regard to reality, cannot 
and should not be held responsible for actions that result 
from those beliefs. They do not have a capacity to form a 
mens rea in any morally relevant sense. 
C. A Note about Negative Symptoms 
 In this paper I have given account only of instances of 
positive symptoms of schizophrenia. Positive symptoms are 
symptoms that are abnormal because of their presence, such 
as hallucinations, delusions, compulsive behavior, and 
others. Conversely, negative symptoms are abnormal by their 
absence; flattening affect, social withdrawal, poverty of 
speech, poverty of action and so on, all greatly decrease 
activity in the schizophrenic in ways that are unlikely to 
cause criminal action. It is difficult, though not 
impossible, to conceive of examples of how depression or 
less coherent speech might result in cases where we would 
consider whether or not an individual was responsible for 
his action in any sort of moral or criminal sense. That is 
to say that negative symptoms appear to be significantly 
more internalized in their consequences, often resulting in 
individuals that are hospitalized or else completely 
withdrawn from any sort of intellectual or social 
interaction, and thus difficult to consider within the 
framework I advocate here. I fully accept that an account 
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might plausibly be given of a negative symptom that affects 
capacity for mens rea in accordance with my argument. I am 
not opposed to such an account, if it is possible, but 
rather find that such an account would likely yield less 
application, and thus emphasize positive symptoms. 
D. Mens Rea and Legal Insanity as Separate Concepts 
In this section, I begin by briefly considering the 
legal insanity defense and the difficulty in overcoming 
that requirement for many schizophrenic symptoms. These 
difficulties make the insanity defense traditionally seem 
like the legal heading that should encompass more 
schizophrenics. Furthermore, as Morse and Hoffman argue, 
the current legal precedent is that “the mens rea issue is 
entirely distinct from the legal insanity issue, even if 
precisely the same evidence would be relevant to 
adjudicating both claims,” (Morse and Hoffman p. 1096). 
After examining the legal insanity defense, I will consider 
more carefully what it would mean to embrace a model of 
mens rea that more heavily relies on a notion of mental 
capacity. 
i. Legal Insanity 
Let us begin by looking at some of the current tests 
for legal insanity as well as the responses to them posed 
by some prominent legal theorists. The definition of legal 
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insanity adopted in the Model Penal Code put for by the 
American Law Institute is as follows:43 
“…[A] person is not responsible for his criminal conduct 
if, at the time of the conduct, as the result of a mental 
disease or defect, he lacked substantial capacity to: 
 1. appreciate the “criminality” (or “wrongfulness”) of 
his conduct; or 
 2. to conform his conduct to the requirements of the 
law.” 
 
An older test for criminal insanity, the M’Naughten test, 
is simpler but similar:44 
 
“…[A] person is [criminally] insane if at the time of the 
criminal act, he was laboring under such a defect of 
reason, arising from a disease of the mind, that he (1) did 
not know the nature and quality of the act he was doing; or 
(2) if he did know it, he did not know what he was doing 
was wrong.” 
 
These definitions are similar in that both contain a 
“volitional” and a “cognitive” prong. The former addresses 
whether the person in question understands what his actions 
actually are and the latter addresses his understanding of 
their moral implications. While there are many varied 
objections to the current tests for legal insanity, I 
intend to object only in a sense most relevant to the 
argument as it has been laid out so far.  
 The main problem with the current tests for legal 
insanity can be understood by invoking yet again our                                                         
43 Lexisnexis Capsule Summary: Criminal Law. Chapter 15, 
“Insanity.” 
<www.lexisnexis.com/lawschool/study/outlines/pdf/crim.pdf> 
Accessed 20 April, 2013. 
44 Ibid. 
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Capgras case. Using the current standards, we could easily 
establish mens rea in the traditional sense; our patient 
does wish to harm someone. We then have to turn to the two 
prongs of our test and inquire as to which, if either, 
might be sufficient to exculpate this patient. It is easy 
to imagine that this patient might agree entirely that 
harming another person is wrong. There goes the volitional 
prong. Next, considering the cognitive prong, it does not 
stretch the imagination any further to imagine that this 
patient could also acknowledge that harming his father is 
against the law, and still to acknowledge that nothing made 
him harm his father. He might therefore have the mens rea, 
the understanding of the legality of an action and an 
appreciation for its moral weight, and be liable for 
criminal prosecution. However, if my argument holds any 
water, then we should not hold our Capgras patient 
criminally responsible for his action that resulted from 
his delusions because he is not even responsible for these 
actions in a moral or theoretical sense. The current tests 
for criminal insanity give account only to mental states as 
they exists or might have existed in the mind of the 
defendant at the moment of action. They do not account in 
any manner for the formation of those states of for the 
ability of the defendant to modify those states at all. The 
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question of whether or not the defendant is able to 
recognize the victim as his father is not one that is 
answered, despite its seemingly obvious relevance to the 
verdict. 
ii. Mens rea, Schizophrenia, and Courtroom Proceedings 
 As was mentioned at the outset, mens rea is a 
requirement in our legal system for criminal liability. It 
is a necessary condition for an act to face criminal 
prosecution; the other necessary condition is the actus 
reus, or the actual criminal act itself. As such, being 
held criminally liable requires both mens rea and actus 
reus be proven by the prosecution. Most criminal litigation 
occurs with in proving the actus reus occurred and not that 
the defendant had the requisite mens rea. In general, cases 
involving mental disorder still assume that the defendant 
had the relevant mens rea and, should they consider the 
relevance of the disorder, confine that consideration to 
either a legal insanity defense or else to questions of 
diminished capacity or mitigated punishment. Therefore, 
most considerations of mental disorder in our legal system 
occur in the midst of guilt determination or afterward, but 
my argument concerning mens rea would require that 
determination of agent responsibility be considered, at 
least in part, at the outset of a criminal trial. Mens rea 
  64 
defenses are based on a prima facie negation of one of the 
necessary conditions for a criminal act. In the United 
States, one case that both exemplifies some of the standard 
conceptions of mens rea as well, as exemplifies some of the 
problems with the status quo at which my argument is aimed, 
is Clark v. Arizona.  
 In Clark, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the insanity 
defense in Arizona. In that state, mental health evidence 
is inadmissible to try and show that the defendant did not 
possess the relevant and requisite mental state at the time 
of the commission of the crime. That evidence is only 
admissible under the standard insanity defense rules. 
Therefore, in Arizona, mens rea is assumed before an 
insanity defense can be made, or else guilt is admitted 
under a diminished capacity plea, but the concept of mens 
rea itself is all but washed out. 
Stephen Morse and Morris Hoffman offer a strong 
critique of the Supreme Court’s decision in Clark that 
emphasizes many points my argument means to address.45 One 
of their many critiques is that the majority opinion in the                                                         
45 Morse, S. J., & Hoffman, M. B. (2007). The uneasy entente 
between legal insanity and mens rea: Beyond Clark V. 
Arizona. Journal of Criminal Law & Criminology, 97(4), 
1071-1149. Retrieved from 
http://search.proquest.com.proxy.library.vanderbilt.edu/doc
view/218441636?accountid=14816 
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Clark decision frequently conflates the notion of legal 
insanity and mens rea, and even rules that Arizona was 
within its constitutional parameters to “channel” all 
considerations of mens rea into a consideration of legal 
insanity as per the Mott rule established in that state. I 
agree with Morse and Hoffman that the mens rea defense 
should necessarily be kept separate from the insanity 
defense for two main reasons. 
The first reason is that the insanity defense varies 
widely between states and some states do not even have an 
insanity defense. Some state, similar to Arizona, have even 
begun to set precedent that any evidence introduced to try 
and disprove mens rea in cases of mental disorder must 
instead be introduced as part of an insanity defense plea. 
Therefore, there can be quite broad inconsistencies between 
jurisdictions on how and when and how mens rea evidence and 
testimony are received. The insanity defense does not 
receive the same legal clout in many jurisdictions as mens, 
rea, so equating the two reduces the status of mens rea to 
a less important legal consideration. Mens rea, because it 
is relatively consistently regarded and applied across all 
jurisdictions in the United States, is held to more 
consistent precedent between jurisdictions. Equally 
important as maintaining the current precedents regarding 
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mens rea are the possible implications of setting any new 
ones. One state setting a new precedent regarding the 
application of mens rea and mental disorder is much more 
likely to have an effect on other states than any new 
ruling on the insanity defense since application of mens 
rea is more homogeneous. 
The second reason I believe mens rea should be 
inherently separate from the insanity defense is because, 
as mentioned above, it is one of two necessary conditions 
for criminal responsibility for an act. So long as a state 
maintains a distinction between strict liability and 
criminal liability, mens rea must necessarily exist. So 
long as mens rea exist, it exist as a necessary condition 
for a criminal act, and therefore must have the ability to 
exculpate a mentally ill defendant if any reasonable doubt 
exist that he lacks mens rea. That is, the reasonable doubt 
standard must be equally applied between any necessary 
conditions of criminal liability, whatever those happen to 
be. Conflation of mens rea and legal insanity, as in the 
Clark case, reduces mens rea from a primary and necessary 
condition of criminal guilt to lesser legal consideration 
akin to diminished capacity. If we must prove guilt beyond 
a reasonable doubt, and guilt has two prongs (actus reus 
and mens rea), then we must give equal evidentiary weight 
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and consideration to both. In mental disorder cases, then, 
it could benefit courts to fact-find on the mens rea issue 
before the actus reus issue since early determination of no 
mens rea would necessarily end litigation.  
 In Clark, the court considers many arguments 
regarding the capacity to form mens rea and how these 
arguments should be regarded or admitted. Morse and Hoffman 
are critical of such arguments, stating, “Asking about a 
defendant's capacity to form a mental state never provides 
better information than inquiring directly whether the mens 
rea was formed in fact…” (Morse and Hoffman, 2007, p.1087, 
1088). They share concern with the court that questions 
about diagnosis or capacity to form specific mental states 
are subject to too much interpretation and disagreement 
from expert witnesses. By ignoring questions and theories 
of capacity, they argue, we are able to limit our arguments 
and considerations in fact finding to whether or not the 
defendant had the specific guilty mental state at the time 
of an act necessary for criminal liability. I disagree with 
this point; capacity considerations can be significantly 
more insightful than Morse and Hoffman claim. Certain 
schizophrenic symptoms might inherently affect the capacity 
to form a mens rea. In addition, there is nothing 
inherently easier about discovering someone’s capacity to 
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form a mental state at a certain time versus discovering 
whether or not they actually had it. In fact, if we have 
record of a diagnosis pre-dating the incident, and 
appropriate confirmation of that diagnosis during courtroom 
proceedings, it might be easier to extrapolate conclusions 
about capacities than about specific thoughts. 
 Recall Capgras delusions. Capgras patients frequently 
believe that an imposter, an alien, a robot, or something 
else has replaced someone close to them. Morse and Hoffman 
would likely agree our patient that killed his stepfather 
lacks mens rea, but they miss the relevant possibility that 
all Capgras patients lack a certain capacity to form mens 
rea toward the replaced person.  It seems that even in 
cases where the patient believes another person has 
replaced his wife, if he desires to harm her, his desire is 
still to harm the imposter and not the actual person that 
is his wife. We could categorically say that Capgras 
patients never act toward “replaced” individuals in a 
legally responsible way because they do not intend such 
acts toward any person that actually exists. Therefore, it 
is quite possible that certain classes of schizophrenic 
symptoms could exculpate defendants for specific actions 
based on the capacity of those defendants to form mens reas 
relative to those actions. Recognizing such theoretical 
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possibilities might be equally as important, if not more 
so, than attempts to determine exact mental states at the 
time of a crime. It is quite possible to debate about the 
mental state of a person based upon circumstantial facts 
about the event itself. However, as long as a schizophrenic 
defendant can be surely said to have been experiencing X 
symptoms at the time of his action, and those symptoms are 
such that they result in loss of capacity for mens rea, we 
can completely skirt around questions of what the 
defendant’s mental state was in that exact moment solely 
because of considerations of specific mental capacities. 
Another point upon which I agree with Morse, Hoffman, 
and the courts in Clark is that the current schemes for 
psychological diagnoses vary to such a degree as to hinder 
our judicial system in many cases. There are many disorders 
with very ambiguous criteria for diagnosis, possibility for 
disagreement about relevant symptoms among clinicians, or 
even diagnoses that are not thoroughly accepted within the 
psychological or medical communities. Therefore, what I 
propose with regards to the legal system’s consideration of 
schizophrenia is what many clinicians, scientists, 
philosophers, and medical professionals have already begun 
advocating, and that is analysis of schizophrenics on the 
basis of their specific symptoms rather than their overall 
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diagnosis (Frith, 1992, p. 11). Indeed, some entire 
investigative and theoretical works examine specific 
symptoms for the sake of giving real and productive 
accounts of those symptoms without the unwieldy backdrop of 
broader formal diagnoses (Graham and Stephens 2000).  
In a similar fashion, regarding schizophrenia and mens 
rea, the legal system might be best served by addressing 
specific symptoms as having certain implications regarding 
mens rea whereas others do not. The advantage of such an 
approach is that someone like Eric Clark can be evaluated 
along a much narrower scale, say of paranoid or persecutory 
delusions, rather than along the very broad scale of a 
schizophrenic diagnosis overall. Secondly, as I advocated 
above, certain symptoms might have greater implications for 
the capacity of mens rea than others. Such considerations 
might allow construction of a comparative scale for 
evaluating mens rea capacities that allow quicker court 
indexing of schizophrenics without relying as heavily on 
competing expert testimony. 
 Given such prospects, there are still obvious 
limitations.  Some considerations will always exists, such 
as the possibility of a malingering defendant, as well as 
considerations inherent to the admission of expert or 
scientific testimony. But these exist and will continue to 
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exist in many other fields of criminal litigation and 
should not pose any special concern here. However, 
clinicians and professionals still disagree in their expert 
opinions, even over more narrowly constrained symptoms in 
cases of mental disorder. It is for this reason that 
continually emerging neuroscientific data must be verified 
and implemented into our standard evaluations of mens rea 
in schizophrenic defendants pursuing such a defense. Such 
data, though still debatable, provides more inherently 
concrete evidence to support claims of specific symptoms or 
cognitive capacities. More will be said about the 
neuroscience specific to schizophrenia and mens rea 
shortly, but for now I want to integrate everything covered 
far so that we might have perspective moving forward. 
 I propose that there be a specific evaluation standard 
for capacity for mens rea in cases of schizophrenia, one 
that should be extrapolated to other cases of other mental 
disorder as well. While I believe many of the details are 
still to be hashed out, there is a relatively intuitive 
form such an evaluation could take; this form is very 
similar to my condition for moral agent responsibility 
established earlier: 
An agent is not criminally liable for an action if mental 
disorder or defect affects cognitive capacities relevant to 
the purported act such that the defendant held the relevant 
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mental state only because of said mental disorder or 
defect. 
 
Under such a standard, it would be possible to evaluate 
schizophrenic symptoms with hopes of determining the 
maximum degree of mens rea possible to them. In an ideal 
situation, such determinations would be made by a 
confluence of psychologists, neuroscientists, legal 
professionals, philosophers and ethicists, and medical 
professionals. The aim should be to figure out which, if 
any, symptoms completely exculpate schizophrenics regarding 
specific actions or mental states, and which others might 
inherently mitigate responsibility to a degree. It is to 
this end that the cognitive sciences are of paramount 
importance to the continued development of a theory of 
capacity. As we have seen in consideration of DMC, 
cognitive neuropsychology is already yielding increasingly 
better tests for certain kinds of capacity. Such tests, 
coupled with advances in functional neuro-imaging, are 
likely the best way forward for collecting and formulating 
the data to drive our legal theory forward. 
E. The Neuroscientific Link Between Theory and Courtroom 
 All of my argument becomes highly moot if it is not 
actually applicable in the courtroom. To this point, I have 
suggested a theoretical mechanism for determining that some 
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schizophrenic symptoms might inherently lead to partial or 
complete loss of ability to form mens rea in some patients; 
I have also argued how such theoretical considerations are 
legally relevant. Now it is our goal to examine how such 
theoretical considerations can actually be played out in 
courtrooms. The above theoretical and legal considerations 
are only relevant if they can be proven in the court of 
law. That is, they need certain kinds of testimony and 
evidence to be presented in trial.  
The fundamental basis of a theory that encourages more 
evaluation of defendants is that our legal system is 
actually capable of consistently and concretely 
categorizing them. In the case of schizophrenic patients 
and their symptoms, nothing will be more crucial in the 
future than establishing the neuroscientific data relevant 
to the legal considerations at hand. In accounting for 
neuroscientific evidence to evaluate the capacity of 
schizophrenic subjects to form mens rea, we need to examine 
what types of evidence give us the information we need. 
That is, we need to ask ourselves what relevant 
neuroscientific data should tell us about schizophrenics in 
order to exculpate them via mens rea defense. In order to 
answer this question, we will first return to our cognitive 
neuropsychological account above in order to see what types 
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of physical relationships we could reasonably hypothesize 
moving forward. Secondly, we will examine some of the 
existing neuroscientific methods and ask ourselves in what 
ways the theories might limit the neuroscience or vice 
versa. Additionally, we will want to keep in mind general 
considerations and limitations regarding neuroscientific 
evidence. Finally, we will conclude with some thoughts on 
what directions neuroscience should take relative to 
schizophrenia and capacity for mens rea. 
i. A Return to Theory 
 This chapter has thus far attempted to tackle, in a 
very narrow way, some very broad topics: schizophrenia, 
neuroscience, and capacity to form mens rea. It is 
important that we continue to narrow and limit the scope of 
our discussion so as to keep our objective in sight. When 
considering the idea of neuroscientific evidence, then, 
there are some kinds of evidence that seem more plausibly 
applicable to cases of schizophrenia and mens rea than 
others. I will argue for and give account of some of these, 
but my account is by no means exhaustive. To reiterate, my 
aim is not to provide the exact concrete basis upon which 
the legal system should restructure itself, but merely to 
provide an initial sketch of what one kind of such a 
restructuring would look like. Before we apply cognitive 
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neuropsychological theory to our question of what 
neuroscience should relevantly tell us, I should note a 
couple of assumptions. The first, and one that hopefully 
will show some support, is that much of what we understand 
to be deficient in schizophrenics is functional as opposed 
to anatomical. That is, as opposed to brain lesions, 
tumors, or trauma, schizophrenia and its symptoms do not 
tend to present with any recognizable physiological 
pathologies in the brain, at least none to this point that 
have been capable of generating diagnosis (Frith and 
Johnstone, 2003, ch. 1). Therefore, the relevant 
neuroscience should examine the functions of different 
brain areas and their interactions and not simply look for 
obviously broken structure. The second assumption is brain 
imaging is more useful for detecting cognitive functions 
and failures than other possible approaches like molecular 
or cellular based approaches. 
 Let us return to our theoretical roots; above I argued 
along with Christopher Frith and others that schizophrenic 
symptoms result from failures in metarepresentation, and 
that those failures result in agents not being responsible 
for certain of their actions. Frith (1992) gives account of 
which brain areas might relate and interact in certain 
normal metarepresentational roles and which of these 
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interactions might be inhibited in some way in 
schizophrenics. He recognizes that there is likely no 
single area for metarepresentation in the brain. Indeed, 
according to his account, it seems that any particular 
metarepresentation must have at least two components 
whereby one is the content of the representation and the 
other is the particular function of that representation 
(Frith, 1992, p. 126-130). Thoughts about my intention to 
write this paper would thus minimally require the component 
parts of content—writing a paper—and willed intention—my 
endeavor to actually act. There are likely many other brain 
areas involved, but we know this particular 
metarepresentation is going to at least involve areas 
active while writing or composing and areas active while 
willing or intending. Such a cognitive approach then allows 
us to begin theorizing relative to certain symptoms what 
parts of the brain we would be interested in examining with 
various brain imaging techniques. 
 Let us now consider again the case of Capgras 
delusions. Ellis and Young (1990) argue that Capgras 
patients experience delusions of mistaken identity because 
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of an error in facial processing.46 They advance a view that 
there is (at least) a primary ventral route of conscious 
recognition of faces and a secondary dorsal route that 
attaches emotional significance. The former is hypothesized 
to run from visual cortex to temporal lobe via inferior 
longitudinal fasciculus whereas the latter is supposed to 
run from visual cortex to limbic system via inferior 
parietal lobe. Given such a theory, we would then want 
neuroscience to show active pathways normal patients and 
failures in those pathways in schizophrenics. Such data 
could, for instance, compare in controls the difference in 
activity between the two pathways when viewing unknown 
faces versus known and emotionally charged faces. It could 
then compare these differences to schizophrenics viewing 
unknown faces, known emotional faces, and known emotional 
faces believed to be imposters. Could this type of data set 
be normalized, it would give us a cognitive pattern to look 
for in neuro-images taken of schizophrenic defendants 
claiming relevant Capgras delusions. 
 A similar consideration can be given to delusions of 
thought insertion. Many theorists (Frith and Done, 1988, 
                                                        
46 Ellis, H. D. and Young, A. W. “Accounting for Delusional 
Misidentifications.” The British Journal of Psychiatry. 
1990, 157:239-248. 
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Frith, 1992, Gray, forthcoming) all appeal to the notion of 
reafferent copy to understand, at least partially, the 
phenomenon of inserted thoughts.47 This notion refers to our 
brain’s mechanism for monitoring actions that we will as 
compared to actions that we carry out. When I look across 
the room, my brain controls the muscles that do the looking 
but also send out reafferent information to other systems 
(visual cortex) coding to them that my gaze is shifting and 
they need not be alarmed. Corollary discharge, as 
reafferent information is sometimes called, is also 
supposed to affect voluntary movement (Frith and Done 
1988). If we recall an analogy from earlier, I feel an 
obvious experiential difference between someone moving my 
arm and me moving my arm. The different experience of these 
two situations is due to the fact that no reafferent 
information is coded when someone else moves my arm. Thus, 
we might conclude that the phenomenal experience of an 
action as my own is dependent upon reafferent information 
or corollary discharge. It is further supposed that 
schizophrenics experiencing alien thoughts experience those 
thoughts as externally generated because there is not 
                                                        
47  Frith, C. D. and Done, D. J. “Toward a Neuropsychology 
of Schizophrenia.” The British Journal of Psychiatry. 1988, 
153:437-443. 
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corollary discharge necessary to “account for that thought 
within [the individuals’] personal psychology.” What areas 
of the brain, then would we want to explore for errors in 
or defects in corollary discharge? A logical beginning 
would be the prefrontal cortex, which is believed 
responsible for goal setting and intentions. Barch (2005) 
offers two more possible areas of interests.48 A possibility 
might be areas responsible for the “central executive” 
function, particularly with regard to context processing. 
An area possibly responsible for errors in central 
executive function is commonly thought to be the dorso-
lateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC). Similarly, another 
theory examines the possibility that the Anterior Cingulate 
Cortex (ACC) is responsible for monitoring errors or 
conflicts in cognitive processing and might be defective in 
schizophrenics with certain symptoms such as thought 
insertion. 
 Clearly, there is much more neuroscience to be done to 
attain the necessary degree of certainty demanded by our 
legal system. However, simply understanding what types of 
information we want from our neuroscientific evidence is a 
                                                        
48 Barch, Deanna, M. “The Cognitive Neuroscience of 
Schizophrenia.” Annual Review of Clinical Psychology. 2005, 
1:321-353. 
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necessary point of origin. Theoretical approaches combined 
with anatomical knowledge can thus drive neuroscience by 
creating the hypotheses that neuroscientific research to 
investigate. Regarding thought insertion, we clearly want 
to know what parts of the brain must function and interact 
properly such that an individual can experience his 
thoughts as his own; we want to know what parts of the 
brain are responsible for corollary discharge in our 
thoughts and not only our voluntary actions. Therefore we 
have given researchers a target, but also given lawyers a 
standard by which to measure the relevance of evidence 
relevant to this symptom. 
ii. Goals and Methods of Neuroscience Relative to 
Schizophrenia and Mens Rea 
 Having examined how theoretical considerations can 
easily translate to neuroscientific ones in schizophrenia, 
we should now examine not only what kinds of information we 
might want from neuroscientific data specifically, but also 
what sort of answers we should seek out and what methods we 
might be able to use to do so. As mentioned earlier, 
research into schizophrenia seems to indicate a large 
functional role of interactions across multiple brain 
areas. While we may have theories on what cognitively is 
happening in the conscious perceptions and thoughts of 
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individuals, we still need functional data from brain 
systems to substantiate these theories in a court of law. 
Ultimately, various technologies for brain and brain 
function imaging will continue to provide both theoretical 
support and courtroom evidence for schizophrenic symptoms 
in the future.  
 I advocate a categorized evaluation of schizophrenics 
for the capacity to form mens rea. Such a scheme easily 
leads to what types of neuroscientific data we would want 
in court. For one, as I already mentioned, 
metarepresentation likely has no one area in the brain. 
Therefore, each classified schizophrenic symptom will need 
its own comprehensive functional, cognitive, anatomical 
theory backed up by the relevant neuroscience. For any 
given symptom, the ideal would be to have specific 
neuroscientific data to show sufficient conditions for 
inhibited capacity for mens rea. There are then two 
important directions that our theory and science should 
move. The first is to examine functional brain data in 
patients in order to establish conditions that are present 
only in individuals with a given symptom. The second is 
that we should study schizophrenic brains equally to how 
much we study “normal” brains to figure out their 
pathologies. We want to make sure that we are not reporting 
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brain phenomena in schizophrenics as unique to them when in 
fact those events occur functionally in all or even most 
brains. 
 In the event that we cannot determine functional brain 
states that exist as sufficient conditions only in 
symptomatic individuals, our theory is not totally dashed. 
Biting the bullet and assuming a less concrete scale in 
favor of one that trends toward plausibility rather than 
statements of fact does not put us outside of a role 
already frequently taken on by our court system. Even if 
the neuroscience is not able to concretely back up each 
schizophrenic symptom, theoretical considerations such as 
mine still provide ample reason to at least make the burden 
of proof higher for the prosecution of schizophrenic 
defendants. That is to say, we can use this approach to 
demonstrate some schizophrenic symptoms show increased 
propensity to distort or prohibit capacity for mens rea. We 
can back up those probabilities with neuroscience 
interpreted much as it is now, and even this more mitigated 
line of argument is likely to cause doubt sufficient to 
impair successful prosecution of many schizophrenics unable 
to form mens rea. 
 I would like to end this chapter by acknowledging that 
neuroscience has feasible limits, at least for the time 
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being, that pose some problems for its role in our legal 
system. Regarding various types of neuro-imaging, critics 
are right to constantly point out that such images do not 
give as concrete information as some experts might 
indicate. Images only show differences in activity in the 
same brain area at different times: 
“An abnormal image does not tell us what is happening 
causally between the abnormality and the brain region, or 
the abnormality and the behavior in question… a brain image 
does not show us what criminal intent, or a "bad" thought, 
looks like.”49 
 
Other problems, just to name a few, are: 
Establishing what a “normal” brain looks like, 
Eliminating noise biases within imaging machines, 
Variation in the interpretation of data, 
How the data can be presented to juries, 
What data can be presented to juries, 
What types of conclusions an expert witness is able to 
draw, 
And many others. 
 
I never argued that neuroscience was perfect, nor that it 
was the sole solution to a problem, but instead argued that 
it was but one necessary piece in the puzzle of properly 
accounting for conditions that seem capable of exculpating 
some schizophrenic patients of criminal liability based on 
their symptoms. My hope is that the problems schizophrenic 
                                                        
49 Tancredi, Laurence R. and Brodie, Jonathan D. “The Brain 
and Behavior: Limitations in the Legal Use of Functional 
Magnetic Resonance Imaging.” American Journal of Law and 
Medicine. 2007, 33:271. 
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delusions can pose to the necessary condition of mens rea 
has sufficiently warranted a reevaluation of the status quo 
in spite of the limitations of any single part of my 
argument. 
F. Summary 
 Schizophrenia is a mental disorder that presents with 
many different symptoms and pathologies. While these 
symptoms come varied in expression and degree, I have 
argued that some affect the consciousness and cognitive 
abilities of individuals to a point that absolves them of 
agent responsibility for certain actions and so also 
absolves them of criminal liability for those actions. 
These individuals are not criminally liable for their 
actions because, regarding those specific actions, they 
lacked the capacity to form the necessary mens rea, and so 
de facto also lacked the mens rea itself.  The cognitive 
impairment behind these and other schizophrenic symptoms is 
based on failure of the schizophrenic to represent thoughts 
of the second order—to have metarepresentations—of certain 
types. Contrary to arguments by some legal theorists, 
considerations of capacity are important in the discussion 
of mens rea. In the case of schizophrenia, these 
considerations are important because metarepresentational 
failures inherently alter or prohibit certain cognitive 
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capacities, and sometimes these capacities affect one’s 
ability to form appropriate mental states toward others. 
Furthermore, because mens rea is such a broad legal 
consideration, and one that carries a legal burden of proof 
equal to that of the actus reus, it must be established or 
assumed at the outset of criminal litigation. Therefore, a 
better evaluation of mens rea must exist if we are to 
properly and fairly consider schizophrenic and other 
mentally disordered individuals for criminal liability. 
While the diagnosis of schizophrenia is not enough to 
exculpate an individual, it should be sufficient to warrant 
a deeper examination of capacity for mens rea based on the 
“relevant/only-because” standard I articulated above. This 
standard, I argue, can be evaluated on a case-by-case 
basis, but should be capable of a different kind of 
categorical determination based upon the diagnosed symptoms 
of a defendant. That is, a categorical scheme can and 
should be implemented regarding symptoms of schizophrenia 
(and other disorders) that mitigate some or all capacity 
for relevant mens rea in a crime. I then argue that each 
symptomatic standard should be upheld by court deference to 
neuroscientific data that accounts for the relevant 
impairment of metarepresentation in that symptom.  
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Every symptom of schizophrenia has a basis somewhere 
in the brain. Ideally, each one of these functional defects 
should be accounted for and all symptoms relevant to 
capacity to form mens rea should be included under the 
evaluative scheme I propose. The reasons for such changes 
in evaluation stem from the fact that the insanity plea is 
not universally recognized in our country, nor is it 
uniformly defined, nor do the same standards apply across 
states. Meanwhile, mens rea is a necessary condition for 
criminal liability in all jurisdictions, and so a universal 
approach to expounding upon mens rea will be both further 
reaching and more immediately tangible. It will put the 
mental and cognitive abilities of mentally ill defendants 
at the forefront of courtroom proceedings, rather than in 
the midst of other fact finding. Such a reevaluation can 
and will only benefit both our legal system and those it 
serves. Ultimately, even should my account fail to provide 
the warrant I intend, I hope it nonetheless provides 
warrant for continued interaction between legal theorists, 
psychological theorists, and neuroscientists in order to 
maximize fairness and respectful concern for the experience 
of schizophrenic symptoms in mentally ill defendants. 
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Conclusion 
 
 At the outset, I claimed that my goal was to show that 
mental capacity is a concept that can and should be better 
theorized in our legal system. One primary reason for 
better theorizing this relatively underused concept is that 
it will allow us to better track constantly evolving and 
emerging cognitive data. Much in the way that many 
researchers and theorists have found it useful to theorize 
and measure schizophrenia by individual symptoms, a useful 
way to evaluate mental status as our tools improve will 
likely be by individual capacities. A second reason to 
build up a better legal theory around mental capacity is 
that many of the terms we currently employ, such as 
competency, legal insanity, and diminished capacity, 
actually serve different and often insufficient roles. 
Continued implementation of these legal tools will likely 
continue to marginalize and underserve patients and 
defendants in our hospitals and legal system. Given the 
dramatic difficulty that comes from simply trying to 
understand the experience of someone suffering from severe 
and perplexing delusions, it only seems just that 
significantly more nuanced legal theory exist so as to 
better be able to characterize and capture her experience. 
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 In Chapter I, I examined the notion of Decision Making 
Capacity, particularly in hospitals and as discussed by 
bioethicists. The first of two major goals within that 
chapter was to show one emerging area of theory that 
particularly involves mental capacity and already shows a 
good track record for informing every day medical practice, 
and with hopefully obvious legal ramifications. The second 
goal was, while arguing for and against Susan Wolf, to put 
forward a limited argument about how law, philosophical 
theory, and emerging science should interact with one 
another. The primary point of emphasis from Wolf’s argument 
is that, regarding bioethics, our laws should be informed 
first by bioethical concerns, and not merely vice versa. 
The primary take away from my addendum, however, was that 
top down theory still has a highly relevant place in 
driving and directing bottom up inductive research that 
Wolf sees as ultimately regulating our bioethics much 
better than classical midlevel principalism. The third and 
final aim of Chapter I was to show how a closely related 
concept to capacity, that of competency, serves a different 
role and truly occupies different conceptual space. I then 
argued at various points that the two are best theorized 
separately as distinct concepts from one another, so that 
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they may be tested and written into our legal doctrine 
accordingly. 
 Chapter II saw a different approach to mental 
capacity; rather than examining a debate within bioethics 
the context was moved to the sphere of criminal litigation 
and decisions about when mentally ill defendants can be 
held criminally liable for their actions. The mental 
capacity under examinination here is not that of decision 
making, is rather the capacity of defendants to form a 
particular mental state relevant to the criminal act in 
question. The argument broadly runs that if a mental 
disorder prohibits a defendant from forming or holding the 
particularly required criminal intent, or mens rea, then 
that defendant cannot possibly be held criminally liable. 
To make this argument, I confined myself to examining only 
two of many symptoms of schizophrenia, one of many mental 
disorders. My goal in such specificity was to show how 
highly complex and nuanced an undertaking this sort of 
theory of capacity will likely be, and also to show how 
theory, law, and cognitive science can and should coexist 
throughout the process. Basically, I hoped to model a 
bioethics of law approach to these individual symptoms. 
Similarly to the first chapter, I attempted to show how 
related legal concepts failed to do conceptual justice to 
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some members of our society. Specifically, the way I employ 
capacity for mens rea works almost like a hybrid of the two 
existing concepts of diminished capacity and legal 
insanity. On the one hand, it is decided at the outset of 
court proceedings, much like a diminished capacity plea 
would be, but on the other hand it exculpates the defendant 
of criminal liability in favor of hospitalization and 
treatment. The reasons for the distinction are that 
diminished capacity accepts criminal liability as a lesser 
evil often where there should be none, while the criminal 
insanity defense often faces strict or peculiar evidentiary 
rules, already assumes mens rea where maybe one was 
impossible, and is inconsistently applied across states. 
 Ultimately, in Chapter II I argued for a legal system 
whereby evaluation of mental capacity could allow for 
better classification of mentally ill defendants at the 
outset of court proceedings. Much in the same way DMC 
exists in degrees, I assume that other capacities exist in 
degrees as well, and having a neurolegal taxonomy of mental 
capacities would allow a highly specific legal treatment of 
mentally ill people encountering our legal system in the 
criminal context. As far as my starting point of 
schizophrenia, this particular illness offered some stark 
benefits as it has many bizarre and obvious symptoms to 
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choose from that are well documented and chronicled in 
literature across cultures. However, the illness also 
suffers some theoretical drawbacks in that so little is 
known about its physiological causes that theorizing future 
legal theory based on the illness itself is speculative at 
best. However, there seems to be more promise if we 
continue to look at specific symptoms and their cognitive 
mechanisms rather than the illness as a whole. 
Additionally, there are many more mental capacities that 
could be reasonably added to our legal doctrine than the 
two I have posited here. I hoped to provide a glimpse into 
one that is already well theorized and seeing increasingly 
promising results in practice, DMC, as well as one that is 
not fully acknowledged for its useful potential in the 
future. Mental capacity is a very broad and far reaching 
concept, but one that I hope can play more of a role in our 
legal theory in the future. If the amount of cognitive 
science being generated each year is any indication as to 
where our legal system is headed, then philosophers and 
bioethicists are going to have their hands full fitting new 
knowledge about our mental lives into legal doctrine and 
medical practice. It is an exciting time to work in such an 
interdisciplinary environment, but also a time in which we 
must begin looking to new theoretical tools that can handle 
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the increasing workload provided by the complex interplay 
between theory, data, and practice. Law, neuroscience, and 
philosophy would all greatly stand to benefit from adding 
and expounding upon the concept of mental capacity as one 
means of adding to that toolbox. 
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